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It is almost thirty years since James Tobin’s paper “Keynesian Models of 
Recession and Depression” (Tobin (1975)) appeared. In that paper Tobin, following 
a suggestion by Milton Friedman, showed that Keynesian conclusions followed 
naturally if we appended a “Marshallian” (short-run) dynamic adjustment to a 
standard macro model.  If, per contra, the dynamics was of the “Walrasian” variety, 
classical results followed. The framework that Tobin used was, of course, a standard 
work-horse of that era--an IS-LM-Phillips Curve model. Tobin’s basic insight seems 
to have been forgotten since. 
In the last two decades, various authors have sought to provide micro-
foundations for macroeconomics. While macroeconomists of a classical persuasion 
tend to prefer a competitive framework, those who want to provide Keynesian 
economics with microeconomic underpinnings prefer a non-competitive (usually a 
monopolistically competitive) framework.  In an imperfectly competitive framework 
(and/or in a model with increasing returns to scale) it is possible to obtain a 
multiplier-type relationship and policy intervention can (under certain circumstances) 
improve the welfare of all individuals
1.  
There is, however, near-unanimity (the qualification “near” is probably 
redundant) that a multiplier cannot be obtained in a competitive model. For instance 
in the words of an influential survey (Matsuyama (1995)):“…the standard 
neoclassical paradigm, exemplified by Kenneth Arrow and Frank Hahn (1971), 
emphasizes the self-adjusting mechanisms of market forces with its efficient 
resource allocation.  As different activities compete for scarce resources, expansion 
of one activity comes only at the expense of others, which tends to dampen any 
perturbation to the system.” (p. 702). And, on the other hand: “The departure from 
perfect competition means that the firm, faced with downward sloping demands, sets 
prices above marginal cost….  Aggregate demand management could be effective in 
stimulating aggregate economic activity as well as raising the welfare of the 
economy.” (p. 703). 
In this paper, I revisit Tobin’s insight but in an optimizing setting. I show that it 
is possible to obtain a multiplier—that is reminiscent of the text-book Keynesian-
                                                            
1 See, for instance, Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), Gali (1994), Mankiw (1988), Kiyotaki (1988), Startz 
(1984), (1989), Heijdra (1998) and Weitzman (1982); for surveys see Dixon and Rankin (1994), 





cross diagram--in a perfectly competitive optimizing model. This is done in a two-
sector overlapping generation model, where the consumption good is capital-
intensive and the elasticities of substitution between inputs in both sectors are 
"low"—the latter assumption is equivalent to assuming that the short run dynamics is 
of the Marshallian variety
2. The model satisfies the usual conditions for dynamic 
efficiency viz. the rate of interest exceeds the population growth rate
3. The new 
equilibrium path does not Pareto-dominate the initial equilibrium, but may improve 
the welfare of all those individuals who “contribute” to the increase in aggregate 
demand (i.e., all generations barring the initially old). 
The model is described in the next section and the aggregate demand 
experiment is introduced. In section 3, I provide an example with Leontief 
technologies, while section 4 looks at the case with non-zero elasticities of 
substitution in production. Finally, in section 5 there are some concluding comments. 
 
2. The  Model 
The (closed) economy consists of overlapping generations of individuals or 
households with two-period lives. Each household supplies one unit of labour in the 
first period of its life and in the second period consumes the saving from the first 
period plus the return on these savings. No household is altruistically linked to any 
future generations i.e., there are no bequests or inheritances. The population is 
constant—the size of the population is assumed to be two, the size of each 
generation is unity. Agents have perfect foresight. We shall study the properties of 
the model by log-linearizing it around the initial steady state. 
The representative household born in time period t maximises the following 
logarithmic utility function
4 




t t 1 log ) 1 ( log + + ρ                      t=….-2,-1,0,1,2….  (1a) 
                                                            
2 There is some empirical justification for both our capital intensity and low elasticities of substitution 
assumptions. On capital intensities see e.g., Takahashi, Mashiya and Sakagami (2004) who find that 
the Japanese investment goods sector is more labour-intensive (since 1975). The authors have 
calculated the capital-intensities for the two sectors for the UK, the US and Germany and found the 
investment good to be labour-intensive. Buffie (2001) summarizes time series studies as having 
obtained elasticities in production of around 0.5. 
3 See Abel et al. (1989), Buiter (1981), Lang (1996), Matsuyama (1991) and Shell (1971) for 
discussions on the possibility of overaccumulation in two-period overlapping generations models. 
4 Galor (1992)(section 6), Azariadis (1993) (example 13.5) and Cremers (2001) use the two-sector 







i t+  is the consumption in period t+i of a household born in t and ρ  > 0 
is the rate of time preference. 
Its lifetime budget constraint is 




t t 1 1
1 ) 1 ( + + +         ( 1 b )  
where  t W  is the wage rate in time period t and r 1    +    t  the own interest rate on 
one period consumption loans between t and t+1. 
This yields  
t
t
t W    +    2 /    +    1    =    C )] ( ) [( ρ ρ         ( 2 a )    
and  t 1    +    t
t
t W    +    2    /    r    +    1    =    C )] ( ) [( 1 ρ +       ( 2 b )  
The savings and indirect utility functions are given by (where m is a constant), 
t
t
t t t W    +    2    =    C W S
1 ) (
− − ≡ ρ         ( 3 )  
) ( )] log( log ) [( ) 1 , ( 1 1 ρ ρ +    1 / r   +    1    +   W    +    2    +    m   r W V   =    V t t t t t + + = +    (4) 
Note that savings in time period t do not depend on any variable in time period 
t+1 (e.g., the expected return on capital in t+1). This makes the model’s dynamics 
scalar—i.e., it can be represented by a single difference equation (equation (7) 
below). 
  The production side of the economy is represented by two cost-equal-to-price 
equations. The consumption good (C) and the investment good (I) are produced 
under conditions of constant returns to scale using the two inputs, capital (K) and 
labour (L). All inputs are mobile between sectors instantaneously. Capital is 
assumed to depreciate completely in the process of production
5. 
1   =   R . a   +   W . a t KC t LC          ( 5 a )  
p   =   R . a   +   W . a t t KI t LI          ( 5 b )  
where aij is the requirement of the i
th  input (i = K, L) in the production of the 
j
th  good  (j = C, I), p is the relative price of the investment good in terms of the 
numeraire good C, and R is the gross return on capital. Since we assume capital 
depreciates completely in the process of production, in equilibrium: 
                                                            
5 This is for analytical convenience only. Dropping this requires capital gains on the sale of capital to 







t t t p R r / ) 1 ( 1 1 + + = + . The aij's are functions of the relative factor prices unless the 
technologies are Leontief (as in section 3). 
There are two goods markets (for C and I) and two factor markets (for K and 
L). By Walras’ Law, if three of these are in equilibrium in any period, then so is the 
fourth one. We thus have (the aggregate demand shock is introduced below in 
equation (9)) 
1    =    I . a .C a t LI t LC +          ( 6 a )  
k    =    I . a    +    C . a t t KI t KC          ( 6 b )  
t t t W    =    I . p
1 ) 2 (
− + ρ          ( 6 c )  
Equations (6a), (6b) and (6c) are the market-clearing conditions for the labour, 
capital and investment goods markets respectively. The variable Ct  is the production 
of the consumption good, I t is the output of the investment good and kt is the 
capital stock  (all are per worker magnitudes in time period t).  
Finally, the dynamics of the economy is represented by the difference 
equation  
I    =    k t 1    +    t           ( 7 )  
Appendix 1 shows that we can solve equations (6a) and (6b) to get 
) , ( t t t k p I I = . Substituting this in equation (6c) we can solve  ) ( t t k p p =
6. Equation 
(7) can then be linearized around the steady state and written as 
t t dk k I k p p I dk )} / ( ) / )( / {( 1 ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = +           (8a)         
Stability requires  
1 ) . ( / 1 1 ≤ + = ≤ − + Ik pk Ip t t dk dk η η η        ( 8 b )      
 where  k    -    k      dk i + t i + t ≡  is the deviation of the t+i period capital per worker from 
its steady state value (a variable's steady state value is denoted without a time 
subscript). An  ij η  is the elasticity of variable i with respect to j—these are given in 
Appendix 1. 
  The expression for  pk η  will play a crucial role in obtaining the results that we 
do in this paper, so we turn to a detailed discussion of this expression. Equation (6c) 
can be differentiated logarithmically to obtain (Γ  is a measure of increase in 
aggregate demand to be discussed below) 
                                                            





  Γ + + = t t t I p W ˆ ˆ ˆ   
  or (using (A1.2a), (A1.4a) and (A1.4c)) 
Γ + = − − t Ik t Ip Wp k p ˆ ˆ ) 1 ( η η η         ( 9 )  
If the consumption good is capital-intensive,  1 > Wp η and 0 < Ik η  (from the 
Stolper-Samuelson Theorem and the Rybczinski Theorem, respectively). The term 
) 1 ( Ip Wp η η − − ≡ Ψ , measures the contribution of a change in price to excess demand 
for the investment good, ceteris paribus.  The demand for capital goods is given by 
the elasticity of supply of savings  Wp η , while the elasticity of the supply 
responsiveness of investment goods (measured in units of consumption) is given by 
Ip η + 1 . We assume that Ψ >0 i.e., that the (upward-sloping) demand curve for 
investment is more responsive to a price change than the supply curve (also upward-
sloping)—i.e., the short-run dynamics is of the Marshallian-type (Ψ <0 is the 
Walrasian case)
7.  
In figure 1, the II curve is drawn depicting p.I(p,k) and the SS curve for 
Sη W(p)/[(2+ρ )]—ignore the broken lines for now. With p on the horizontal axis, when 
the II curve is flatter than the SS curve, we have Marshallian dynamics. Note that if 
we had output on the horizontal axis, we would get back the Keynesian-cross 
diagram (in its saving equals investment variant). 
With our capital intensity and short run dynamics assumptions, equation (9) 
gives  
  0 / ˆ / ˆ < Ψ = ≡ Ik pk k p η η , and  0 / ˆ > Γ p  (for Γ >0). 
 
3.    An Exogenous Decrease in Desired Saving with Leontief 
Technologies 
It would be enormously helpful for expository purposes to start off with the 
case where the elasticities of substitution in production are zero
8.  
                                                            
7 Note our interpretation of demand and supply for capital is at variance with what might be the natural 
interpretation of these terms in a one good dynamic model. There savings are taken to be the supply 
of capital and  1 + t k , the next period’s capital stock, constitutes the demand for it (see e.g., Diamond 
(1965), Galor and Polemarchakis (1986) and Persson (1985) for such a usage). 
8  Calvo (1978) was the first one, to the best of my knowledge, to use a two-sector overlapping 






With Leontief technologies in both sectors, the stability requirement (see 
equation (8b)) is now (with  0 = Ip η ),  0 1 < < − Ik η  which, in turn, requires  LC KC λ λ 2 >  
(where  λ ij is the share of sector j in the total employment of input I, e.g., 
k C aKC KC / ≡ λ )
9. 
Consider a decrease in desired saving e.g., an increase in the rate of time 
preference, ρ —we can call this an increase in “animal spirits”
10. What does this do to 
national income, wages etc.? Is it true that in the new equilibrium the increase in 
income, if at all, comes at the expense of other activities? It is obvious that in the 
absence of unemployment of some resource (or, more generally, with elastic factor 
supplies), the scale of some activities would be reduced, as those of others are 
increased. The question is then whether this precludes the presence of a multiplier-
type relationship? 
If the economy were initially in a steady state, the economy jumps straight to a 
new steady state following a change in (the composition of) aggregate demand. To 
see this note that in equations (5a), (5b), (6a) and (6b), now the  s aij' are constants 
(i.e., do not depend on factor prices). From equation (6a) and (6b),  t I  and  t C  are 
determined in any period, given  t k . If we start from a steady state, then I = k (from 
equation (7)). So, from equations (6a), (6b) and (7) we determine the values of k, I 
and C. These are invariant to a change in desired saving. 
Recalling, from (A1.2a), ) ( t t p W W =  and from (A1.4a) and (A1.4c) (with 
Leontief technologies),  ) ( t t k I I = . With k1 predetermined (and equal to the initial 
steady state value, if the system starts from a steady state), we have from equation 
(9) (with both  0 ˆ , 0 = = k Ip η ) 
S dA p W / ˆ ˆ + =         ( 9 ’ )  
where,  Γ≡  dA/S (dA is the increase in aggregate demand in terms of the 
numeraire--note initially A=0, and  ρ ρ d S dA )] 2 /( [ + = ).  
                                                            
9 Note if technologies are Leontief, stability is ruled out if the consumption good is labour-intensive. 
10 Note this usage of the expression “animal spirits” is at variance with e.g., Weil (1989). Mine refers to 
an exogenous increase in the rate of time preference or an exogenous fall in savings, whereas Weil’s 
model, being a one-sector model, uses the term to denote an increase in savings. See also Howitt 





Thus (belowθ ij  is the share of the i
th  input in the  j
th  sector price, e.g., 
/p   .W a     LI LI ≡ θ , and        -          LI LC θ θ ≡ ∆ --see Appendix 1 for details), 
) . /( / ˆ S dA p KI θ ∆ − =          (10a) 
) . /( / ˆ S dA W KI KC θ θ =          (10b) 
2 / ) 2 .( / > + = KI KC dA dW θ ρ θ        (10b’) 
0 ) . /( / ˆ < − = S dA R KI LC θ θ         ( 1 0 c )  
  Now, the GDP (denoted by Q) is given by the identity 
I p C Q . + ≡  
So,  p pI dQ ˆ . =      (by the envelope theorem) 
0 / / > ∆ − = KI dA dQ θ        ( 1 1 )  
In equation (11) above, dQ/dA is “likely” to be greater than unity since 
( KI θ / ∆ − ) is “likely” to be greater than unity (the stability condition requires good C to 
be sufficiently capital intensive)—for the parameter values in Appendix 1, dQ/dA is 
1.5. 
  Given these, the utility of generation 0 (the initially old) 
0 ) / )( / ( 0 < − = = dA p R kdR dV KI LC θ θ       ( 1 2 )    
  And those of the subsequent generations is given by (R/p>1 is the dynamic 
efficiency condition--see Appendix 2 for a derivation) 
0 )]. . /( ) 1 ) / (( [ > − = dA p p R V dV KI LC W θ θ       ( 1 3 )  
where  ) ). 1 /(( ) 2 ( W VW ρ ρ + + = . 
 
We can sum this up as Proposition 1: 
Proposition 1: If the technologies in both the sectors are Leontief and 
the economy is initially in a steady-state, then an exogenous decrease in 
saving takes the economy to a new steady instantaneously with a lower R/p, 
and higher W and Q. There is a multiplier effect on W, and possibly Q. As a 
consequence, the old (generation 0) lose, but everyone else is better off, if the 
economy is dynamically efficient. 
The intuition for the multiplier process is that, given Leontief technologies and 
starting off from a steady state, k, and hence I, are fixed. Savings have to finance 





increases, wages have to increase to generate the given amount of real savings (in 
terms of the I good). This requires p to increase, which raises Q. The rise in W 
increases welfare of generation 1 onwards, if R/p >1 (i.e., the interest rate was above 
the population growth rate). The increased W is accompanied by a fall in R that 
causes  0 V  to fall. Note that all the action is coming from a change in relative prices—
the real quantities, C, I and k, do not change. Also note that Rybczinski Theorem—a 
veritable Pandora’s box in two sector models—plays no role in the results obtained. 
In figure 2, the initial equilibrium is at  0 E . An autonomous decline in desired 
saving moves the SS line down to  1 1S S . The new equilibrium is at  1 E --the price of 
investment goods increases from  0 p  to  1 p .  
A brief point about the perceived difference between Keynesian and classical 
models is in order here. It is often mentioned that classical models (including the 
Solow growth model) do not have an independent investment function. In this 
section, we have seen that in a completely neoclassical setting, we can have an 
independent investment function that is dictated by technology. Hence it is not 
surprising that we get results that one normally associates with Keynesian models
11. 
 
4.  The Multiplier with Non-Zero Elasticities of Substitution. 
With non-zero elasticities of substitution in production, there are two changes: 
(i) the value of static multiplier changes because  0 > Ip η ; and (ii) there is non-
degenerate dynamics—one implication of this is that even with dynamic efficiency 
not all generation (barring generation 0, of course) may gain. I discuss what happens 
in periods 1, 2 and the steady state, leaving the details of the dynamics for Appendix 
3. 
  Rewrite equation (9’) as follows 
) / ( ˆ ˆ ˆ
1 1 1 S dA I p W + + =        ( 1 4 )    
As before,  ) ( t t p W W =  but now  ) , ( t t t k p I I = . With k1 predetermined, we have 
(remember  ) 1 ( Ip Wp η η − − ≡ Ψ ) 
) /( 1 / ˆ1 Ψ = S dA p          (15a) 
                                                            
11 Robert Solow, in correspondence with the author, has queried whether the presence of a multiplier 
makes it a “Keynesian model”. I would say that it is a competitive model with properties one expects in 





) /( / ˆ
1 Ψ ∆ − = S dA W KC θ         (15b) 
2 ) /( ) 2 ( / 1 > ∆Ψ + − = ρ θ KC dA dW        (15b’) 
0 ) /( / ˆ
1 < Ψ ∆ = S dA R LC θ         ( 1 5 c )  
  The only change from the Leontief technologies case is that now the price 
change also elicits a supply response in the investment goods market. 
The change in GNP ( I p C Q . + ≡ ) in period 1is given by 
0 / 1 / ˆ . / 1 1 > Ψ = = dA p pI dA dQ        ( 1 6 )  
Note that both 1 W and  1 Q  rise by more than in the Leontief case (for the 
assumed parameter values in Appendix 1,  dA dQ / 1  is 2.5 approximately, compared 
to 1.5 in the Leontief case). This is because Ψ  (which appears in the denominator) 
≡ ) / ( ) / ( ∆ − < − ∆ − KI Ip KI θ η θ
12. 
  The changes in the next period (i.e., period 2) are given by 
0 )] /( [ ˆ ˆ ˆ
1 1 2 > Ψ = = = dA S p I k Ip Ip η η        (17a) 
dA S p Ik Ip )] /( ) 1 [( ˆ
1
2 Ψ Ψ + =
− η η        (17b)   
dA S W Ik Ip KC )] /( ) 1 ( [ ˆ 1
2 Ψ ∆ Ψ + − =
− η η θ       ( 1 7 c )  
dA S R Ik Ip LC )] /( ) 1 ( [ ˆ 1
2 Ψ ∆ Ψ + =
− η η θ        (17d) 
  Note, that if  0 ) 1 ( 1 < − − − Ik Ip Wp η η η  i.e., if  Ψ > − Ip Ikη η , then  0 ˆ 2 < p  and 
0 ˆ
2 < W . In this case the direct effect of the increased demand (i.e., dA/S) is 
outweighed by the decline in investment caused by increased capital accumulation 
(remember the investment good is labour-intensive).  
If the initial equilibrium was at  0 E in figure 1, the change in the rate of time 
preference, shifts the SS curve down (the dashed line  1 1S S ), with the period 1 
equilibrium at  1 E . In period 2, as capital is accumulated, the II curve shifts down to 
1 1I I , with the new equilibrium  2 E  to the left of  1 E  (and possibly to the left of  0 E ).   
The new steady state of the economy is obtained (by solving equations (6c) 
and (7) together).   
 
                                                            
12 Ψ >0 implies  0 ) /( ) 1 )( / ( > ∆Ω − − ∆ − I LC I KI ε λ ε θ , while  dA dQ / 1 requires 





dA S k p Ik ). / 1 ( ˆ ˆ + = Ψ η          ( 1 9 )  
k p k Ik Ip ˆ ˆ ˆ η η + =          ( 2 0 )  
And, so 
] /[ 1 / ˆ S dA p Ξ =          (21a) 
0 ] /[ ) ( / ˆ > ∆ Ξ − = S dA W KC θ         (21b) 
0 ] /[ ) ( / ˆ < ∆ Ξ = S dA R LC θ         ( 2 1 c )  
0 } ) 1 /{( / ˆ > Ξ − = S dA k Ik Ip η η       (21d)   
0 ] /[ 1 / > Ξ = dA dQ          (21e) 
where  Ψ ≥ − − − ≡ Ξ
− 1 ) 1 ( 1 Ik Ip Wp η η η  
Since Ξ   ≥   Ψ , the long run increases in p, W and Q are smaller than the 
corresponding ones in the short run--this is due to a crowding-in of capital, which 
lowers investment, ceteris paribus
13. Startz (1989), in a monopolistically competitive 
model, had obtained a similar result and had attributed this to an entry of new firms 
and the consequent whittling away of profits. In Baxter and King (1993), however, 
the long run fiscal multiplier exceeds the short run one because of crowding-in of 
capital (see also Turnovsky and Sen (1991) for a crowding-in of capital in an open 
economy framework).
 This is because in an optimal growth model, in the steady 
state the rate of time preference has to equal the marginal product of capital. If 
labour supply increases (due to e.g., increased (lump sum) taxation), there is a 
crowding-in of capital to enable the capital-labour ratio to go back to its previous 
value. 
Turning to the welfare effects  
0 ) .( ). / ( / ˆ . / .
1
1 1 1 0 < ∆Ψ = = =
− dA p R dA R Rk dA dR k dV LC θ     (22) 
) 1 /( )] / ˆ ( ) / ˆ ( ) / ˆ ).( 2 [( / 1 2 1 1 ρ ρ + − + + = dA p dA R dA W dA dV  
0 ) ) 1 /(( } ) 1 ( 1 ) )( 2 {(
1 1 1 > Ψ + ∆ Ψ + + − ∆ − + =
− − − S LC Ip Ik KC ρ θ η η θ ρ    (23) 
(this expression is positive because compared to the (steady state) welfare change 
with Leontief technologies, we have a positive term  0 ) )( (
1 > Ψ∆
−
LC Ip Ik θ η η ).  
  
                                                            





And the steady state utility change is given by 
0 )] / ˆ ( ) 1 ) / [( / > − − = dA R S p R V dA dV W       ( 2 4 )  
  The change in long run welfare is lower compared to the short run because as 
capital gets crowded in, some of the increased aggregate demand disappears—in 
figure 1, the II line shifts down--thereby checking the increase in wages and the fall 
in the interest rate. As long as the economy is dynamically efficient, the wage effect 
dominates, though (see Appendix 2).       
The dynamics of prices is summarized in Appendix 3. Equation (A3.1) is the 
basic dynamic equation governing the evolution of  t p ˆ . Equation (A3.2) is the solution 
to this difference equation. Equations (A3.3) and (A3.4) respectively give us the 
initial condition and the steady state values. Equation (A3.5) is the root of the 
equation. Equation (A3.6) gives the general expression for welfare. 
The solution to the difference equation (A3.1) given in (A3.2) gives us some 
understanding about the possible reasons why the wage rate may fall in period 2 and 
with it the welfare of generation 2. Also note that the steady state welfare rises, so 
that the possible decline in welfare happens, if at all, only during the transition. To 
see this 
1 1 1
1 ) ( ) ) ( ) (( / ˆ
− − −
+ Ξ + Θ Ξ − Ψ = S S S dA p
t
t       ( 2 5 )  
Since, the initial change in  t p ˆ  is greater than its steady state value (since 
Ψ <Ξ ), i.e.,  1 ˆ p overshoots its long-run value and in the odd periods following the 
shock (i.e., periods 2,4,6,….) this positive gap gets multiplied by a negative 
number
i Θ  where i is the period since the shock (Θ  is the root of the difference 
equation). In these periods there is a negative effect of capital accumulation on 
investment (and on prices and wages). There is a positive effect through 
1 ) ( ( ˆ
− Ξ = S p ) 
in all periods. In the initial stages the negative effect could dominate while as i 
becomes larger the negative effect dies out and the steady state effects of the fall in 
desired savings on price, wages, output and welfare is expansionary. 
 
5.   Conclusions 
Revisiting Tobin’s insight that in a model with Marshallian dynamics one can 
obtain Keynesian results, I looked for a multiplier-type expression in a two-sector 





maximizing agents, I showed that Keynesian-type multipliers, reminiscent of the 
Keynesian-cross, can indeed be obtained. A decline in the saving propensity can 
cause wages and output to increase—since a given amount of investment, ceteris 
paribus, has to be financed, savings, and hence wages, increase. However, unlike 
macroeconomic models with monopolistic competition, the new equilibrium path is 
not Pareto-superior compared to the initial one—at least one generation loses along 
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Equations (4) and (5) yield by logarithmic differentiation (see Atkinson and 
Stiglitz (1980), Chapter 6 for details) 
0    =   R    .    +    W . t KC t LC ˆ ˆ θ θ         ( A 1 . 1 a )  
t t KI t LI p    =    R .    +    W . ˆ ˆ ˆ θ θ         ( A 1 . 1 b )  
where  θ ij  is the share of the i
th  input in the  j
th  sector price (e.g., 
/p   .W a     LI LI ≡ θ )  and a hat over a variable denotes a percentage change. 
From (A1.1a) and (A1.1b), we can solve for  t W ˆ  and  t R ˆ  in terms of  t p ˆ . We 
thus have 
∆ ≡ / ˆ / ˆ θ η KC t t Wp -   =   p W         ( A 1 . 2 a )  
∆ ≡ /     =     p / R LC t t Rp θ η ˆ ˆ         ( A 1 . 2 b )  
where  θ θ θ θ KC KI LI LC    -       =       -         ≡ ∆  and  η ij is the (partial) elasticity of variable i 
with respect to j. From equations (A1.2a) and (A1.2b) we see that    Wp η and 
Rp η depend on capital intensities. Given our assumption that the consumption good is 
capital-intensive,  ∆ <0. And hence by the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, 
. 0 , 1 < > Rp Wp η η  
Similarly by logarithmically differentiating (6a), (6b) and (6c) we have 
] . . ][ ˆ ˆ [ ˆ ˆ I KI LI C KC LC t t t LI t LC .    +     . R    -    W     =    I .    +    C . ε θ λ ε θ λ λ λ     (A1.3a) 
] . . ][ ˆ ˆ [ ˆ ˆ ˆ I LI KI C LC KC t t t t KI t KC .    +     . R    -    W   k      =    I .    +    C . ε θ λ ε θ λ λ λ −    (A1.3b) 
W    =    I    +    p t t t ˆ ˆ ˆ           ( A 1 . 3 c )  
where  λ ij is the share of sector j in the total employment of input i and  j ε  is 
the elasticity of substitution between inputs in the  j
th  industry. 
From equations (A1.3a) and (A1.3b), we have the Rybczinski effects (which 
depend on assumed capital intensities) 
0 / ˆ / ˆ < Ω = ≡ LC t t Ik k I λ η         ( A 1 . 4 a )  
0 / ˆ / ˆ > Ω − = ≡ LI t t Ck k C λ η         ( A 1 . 4 b )  





From (A1.3a) and (A1.3b), we have the supply elasticities  (which are 
independent of capital intensities) 
   0 ) /( } ) ( { ˆ / ˆ > ∆Ω + + = ≡ I KI LI KC LI KI LC C KC LC t t Ip p I ε θ λ λ θ λ λ ε λ λ η    (A1.4c)   
0 ) /( } ) ( { ˆ / ˆ < ∆Ω + + − = ≡ C LC LI KC KC KI LC I KI LI t t Cp p C ε θ λ λ θ λ λ ε λ λ η  (A1.4d) 
   If we substitute for t W ˆ , from (A1.2a) into (A1.3c), we can solve (A1.3a), (A1.3b) 
and (A1.3c) for Ct ˆ , I t ˆ  and  pt ˆ  in terms of kt ˆ . In particular,  
1 }] ) ( { )[ ( / ˆ / ˆ
− + + + Ω ∆ − = Ψ = ≡ I KI LI KC LI KI LC C KC LC KI LC Ik t t pk k p ε θ λ λ θ λ λ ε λ λ θ λ η η  
           ( A 1 . 5 )      
where  Ip Wp η η − − ≡ Ψ 1           
The stability condition for equation (7) in the text requires  
1 ) . ( / 1 1 ≤ Θ ≡ + = ≤ − + Ik pk Ip t t dk dk η η η       ( A 1 . 6 )          
             Thus if the model is stable with  0 < pk η , the convergence is cyclical. The 
condition for stability turns out to be 
0 ) /( }] ) ( { ) 2 ( [ > ∆Ω + + − − I KI LI KC LI KI LC C KC LC LC KC KI ε θ λ λ θ λ λ ε λ λ λ λ θ  (A1.7) 
The condition in (A1.7) is more stringent than for  0 ˆ / ˆ < k p  in (A1.5)--the term 
multiplying  KI θ  is  LC KC λ λ 2 −  instead of  LC KC λ λ − . Consider the following numerical 
example:  4 . 0 , 5 . 0 , 8 . 0 , 8 . 0 , 15 . 0 = = = = = = C I LC LI KC LC ε ε θ θ λ λ . We have both  0 ˆ / ˆ < k p  







In the steady state if we have the general utility function  ) . (
2 1 C C U , then the 
indirect utility function is  
() p




R W d V dW V dV + =        Note  2 1 , 0 SU V U V R W = > =  
dV  () ) / ( ) / (
1 p R d p R S dW VW
− + =    because  2 1 ) / ( U p R U =  
() ) / ( ) / (
1 p R d p R S kdR Idp VW
− + − =    (from W+Rk=C+p.I and the envelope 
































R W 2  
 
because the first two terms in the previous line cancel out (i.e., k=I=S/p), we 
have dV R p R S VW ˆ )) / ( 1 .( . − =    --this appears as equations (17) and (24) in the text. 
 







dA S p p Ik t Wp Ik t
1 1
1 ) )( 1 ( ˆ ) 1 ( ˆ
− −
+ Ψ − + Ψ − = η η η     ( A 3 . 1 )  
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